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ARTICLES
Legal Aspects of the U.S.S.R. Grain
Embargo
JAMES R. WALCZAK
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 4, 1980, in response to the invasion of Afghanistan by the
Soviet Union, President Carter imposed controls on the exportation of
various commodities to the U.S.S.R.' Included among these commodities
were wheat, corn, soybeans, and soybean products. On January 6, export-
ers of these commodities urged that the Government "step into the
shoes" of the Russians and assume the affected contracts. The following
day, Vice-President Mondale publicly announced the Government's com-
mitment to take over the contracts.
The objective of this article is to explain and analyze the legal and
practical aspects of the embargo and the Government's contract assump-
tion operation. It is not the purpose of the author to examine the wisdom
or effectiveness of the embargo. That subject has already been discussed
rather thoroughly in the popular press, as well as more specialized
publications.2
As with most legal problems, however, a simple bare-bones analysis
of the legal authority for the embargo and the contract assumption opera-
tion will shed little light on the true dimensions of the problems which
James R. Walczak is a staff attorney in the Foreign Agricultural and Commodity Stabi-
lization Division, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture. B.S.F.S.,
M.L.T., Georgetown University; M.A., J.D., University of Denver. The opinions and views
expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not necessarily represent the official
position of the United States Government.
1. The controls were initially implemented by regulations which were issued by the De-
partment of Commerce on January 7, 1980. See Fed. Reg. 1883 (1980). They were subse-
quently amended on February 4, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 8289 (1980). The embargo also
included a ban on the sale of American high technology products to the Soviet Union and
the curtailment of Soviet fishing privileges in American waters. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1980, at
1, col. 6.
2. See, e.g., de Borchegrave, Embargo is Failing, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1980, at 60;
Gilpin & Bienen, Economic Sanctions: An Obsolete Weapon?, FORBES, Feb. 18, 1980, at 91;
Morgan, Politics of Grain, ATLANTIC, Feb. 15, 1980, at 29; Paarlberg, Lessons of the Grain
Embargo, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 144 (1980); Wright, Grain Embargo Backfires, NEW STATESMAN,
Feb. 1, 1980, at 157; America's Leaky Grain Embargo, U.S. NEWS & WORLD Rzp., Mar. 24,
1980, at 12.
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faced Government officials on the early days of 1980. For purposes of ex-
plication and elucidation, the nature and purpose of the contract assump-
tion operation and related actions will be set forth in some detail. An
examination of various accounts of these actions reveals a wide misunder-
standing of: (a) what the Government actually did; and (b) why the Gov-
ernment did what it did.8 In this respect, it is hoped that one of the pri-
mary contributions of this article will be an accurate explanation of these
actions. A secondary, but equally important objective is to highlight in a
general way the practical difficulties of imposing and maintaining an em-
bargo of agricultural exports. These difficulties comprise a mixture of eco-
nomic, psychological, and political factors which were clearly illustrated
by the debate that took place within the Reagan Administration prior to
the lifting of the embargo.4 In a broader sense, the study of the imposi-
tion, implementation, and lifting of the embargo can reveal the practical
limitations on the future exercise of the economic power of the United
States in the international arena.8
II. IMPOSITION OF THE EMBARGO
A. Legal Authority to Impose the Embargo
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979.
Within two weeks, the President announced and implemented a complete
range of controls on the exportation of agricultural commodities to the
U.S.S.R., pursuant to authority invested by the Export Administration
Act of 1979.6
The general thrust of the Export Administration Act is set forth in
3. A measure of responsibility for this confusion must be attributed to the government
itself. While the policies described below were formulated within a short period of time,
they were not conceived and implemented simultaneously. Nor were they fully understood
by all the many voices speaking for the various government agencies involved at that time.
Consequently, a fair degree of confusion existed for some time, and still persists to this day.
4. Rightly or wrongly, many farmers and their Congressional representatives viewed the
embargo as a continuing source of harm to the farm economy. They also viewed the em-
bargo as being basically unfair. At the same time, the Reagan Administration has been at-
tempting to project a clearer, "tougher" U.S. position on U.S.-Soviet relations. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, the embargo was a very sensitive emotional and political issue which
President Reagan had inherited from the previous administration.
5. Further limits may be imposed by the Senate Agricultural Committee. As of this
writing, the Senate is taking steps to make it financially prohibitive for the government to
use a commodity embargo as a foreign policy weapon. If approved, the government would
guarantee 100% parity for their commodities in an embargo of only farm products against a
major export customer. Den. Post., May 13, 1981, at 12, col. 1. See note 50, infra, and ac-
companying text.
6. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (Supp. IV 1980). It should be noted that actions taken under
the Export Administration Act are exempt from the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act. See Section 13 of the Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412. See generally Dvorin, The
Export Administration Act of 1979: An Examination of Foreign Availability of Controlled
Goods and Technologies, 2 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 179 (1980); Note, The Trade Agreement
Act of 1979. Title IX Enforcement Provisions, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 123 (1980); Note,
Reconciliation of Conflicting Goals in the Export Administration Act of 1979-A Delicate
Balance, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 415 (1980).
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Section 3 of the Act, which states the policies in furtherance of which the
President may impose export controls. These policies may be broken
down into four general categories: national security, foreign policy, short
supply, and foreign boycotts. For obvious reasons, only the former two
categories served as a basis for justifying the President's imposition of the
Soviet grain embargo.
1. National Security
The national security provisions of the Act are set forth in detail in
Section 5. The authorities of that section may be used only to the extent
necessary "to restrict the export of goods and technology which would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other
country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to
the national security of the United States."'7 With respect to agricultural
commodities, this rationale was applied to wheat and corn.'
There is no provision for a Congressional veto of action taken under
the authority of Section 5. Also, although the statute provides for a peri-
odic review of export controls based on national security,' there is no
"sunset" provision automatically causing such controls to lapse after a
certain period of time.
2. Foreign Policy
The foreign policy provisions of the statute are contained in Section
6. For purposes of foreign policy, export controls may be implemented
only to the extent necessary "to restrict the export of goods and technol-
ogy where necessary to further significantly the foreign policy of the
United States or to fulfill its declared international obligations.' 0 This
rationale was applied to all commodities affected by the embargo.
The foreign policy provisions of the Act differ from the national se-
curity provisions in at least two important respects. First, if the President
exercises the authority conferred by Section 6 with respect to agricultural
commodities, he is required to "immediately report such prohibition or
7. Section 3(2)(A), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A).
8. Many people question whether this rationale could properly be applied to agricul-
tural commodities in view of the limited purposes of the embargo. They argue that the
shipment of grain to the U.S.S.R. cannot be seen as making a "significant contribution to
the military potential" of the Soviet Union. Conversely, Carter Administration officials ar-
gued that the term "military potential" must be read broadly so as to include a willingness
to exert military force as a means of resolving problems in the international arena. In this
respect, the grain embargo does detract from the military potential of the U.S.S.R. to the
extent that it serves as an effective deterrent to further aggressive actions by the Soviet
Union. In any case, as will be seen below, there are some very important differences between
the national security and the foreign policy sections of the Export Administration Act, espe-
cially with respect to agricultural commodities.
9. Section 5(c)(3), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(c)(3). It should be noted, however, that the
Department of Commerce has yet to promulgate the regulations under which such a review
is to take place.
10. Section 3(2)(B), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(B).
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curtailment to the Congress, setting forth the reason therefor in detail."11
Within thirty days after receipt of the report, Congress may by concur-
rent resolution disapprove the export controls, in which case the controls
cease to be effective. In the present case, however, no serious attempt was
made in the Congress to invoke this provision of the law in order to lift
the embargo.1"
Secondly, export controls based solely on foreign policy considera-
tions automatically lapse after one year, unless the controls are specifi-
cally extended by the President.8 Such an extension may only be im-
posed after the President has complied with the procedural and
notification requirements of the Act."' It would therefore appear that the
Congressional veto provisions as to agricultural commodities again be-
came operative when President Carter submitted a report to Congress in
January 1981 extending the export controls then in existence with respect
to agricultural commodities. 6
B. Impact of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement
The embargo imposed by President Carter applied to a wide range of
agricultural commodities. Of all the commodities embargoed, corn and
wheat occupied a special place. In accordance with the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
Grain Agreement of 1975,16 eight million tons of wheat and corn were
permitted to be shipped annually to the U.S.S.R."7 Thus, the existence of
the Grain Agreement had a significant impact on the substance and im-
plementation of the embargo.
11. Sections 6(e), 7(g)(3), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(e), 2406(g)(3).
12. As disenchantment with the embargo has grown, however, a number of serious at-
tempts have been made to prohibit expenditures of public funds to enforce the embargo in
the form of amendments to appropriation bills. None of these attempts have succeeded.
13. Sections 6(a)(2), (b), (e), 7(g)(3), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2405(a)(2), (b), (e), 2406 (g)(3).
14. Section 6, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405.
15. This situation raises an interesting hypothetical. If the President exercised his au-
thority to extend controls, and if the Congress acted to veto the extension, could the limita-
tion on wheat and corn be successfully challenged in court on the grounds that the criteria
for exercising the national security export controls authority have not been met?
It could be argued, perhaps, that the case for national security controls in this area has
weakened considerably, since the element of surprise is no longer present and the Soviets
have had time to adjust their internal marketing system and to find alternative sources of
supply. Also, why is the shipment of eight million tons of grain not contrary to the interests
of national security while amounts in excess of that level are? The counterpoint to this
argument is that the primary national security basis of the grain embargo is its deterrent
effect upon the Soviet Union. This rationale would apply regardless of whether the element
of surprise was present, or whether the embargo was total or partial.
16. Agreement on the Supply of Grain, Oct. 20, 1975, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 26 U.S.T. 2972,
T.I.A.S. No. 8206, reprinted in Mayer, The Russian Grain Agreement of 1975 and Future
United States Food Policy, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 1031, 1069 (1976) [hereinafter cited as the
Grain Agreement].
17. Shipments through January 8, 1980, equaled 5,510,000 tons of corn and wheat com-
bined. Thus, approximately 2,490,000 tons of these commodities were permitted to be
shipped to the U.S.S.R. under license after the embargo was imposed.
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1. Structure of the Grain Agreement' s
In form, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement is a relatively simple,
straightforward document. The agreement provides that the Soviet Union
will take delivery of from six to eight million tons of corn and wheat each
year (measured from October 1 through September 30) during the five-
year life of the agreement.19 If domestic grain production falls short of a
certain level, the United States may reduce the amount covered by the
agreement below the six million ton minimum. Conversely, the United
States and the U.S.S.R. may agree on levels of supply higher than eight
million tons. In fact, for the fourth agreement year (October 1, 1979 -
September 30, 1980) the two countries agreed to a supply level of twenty-
five million tons, most of which was to have been corn.2
It is important to note at this point that while the Grain Agreement
is an agreement between nations, no sales are made by the U.S. Govern-
ment to the Soviet Government. The Grain Agreement provides that
purchases will be made through normal commercial channels. Thus, So-
viet purchases are made by the Soviet foreign trade organization Ek-
sportkhleb2 ' directly or indirectly from private grain companies doing
business in the United States. The U.S. Government monitors these sales
through an export sales reporting system under which exporters are re-
quired to report export sales of certain specified commodities."'
2. Legal Status of the Grain Agreement
The Grain Agreement is not a treaty. It is merely an executive agree-
ment entered into by the President under his general foreign' affairs au-
thority. It has no standing in domestic law, that is, it creates no rights or
obligations which are enforceable by either the U.S. Government or a pri-
18. The Grain Agreement came into existence partially as a result of the massive Soviet
grain purchases in 1972 which created a good deal of turmoil in the grain markets. The
purpose of the Grain Agreement is to guarantee that the Soviet Union will be a steady
purchaser of U.S. corn and wheat, and to prevent the Soviets from catching the U.S. grain
markets unawares, as they did in 1972. For a more detailed account, see Comment, Evolving
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Trading Structure-A Comparison of the 1972 and 1975 Agreements,
4 SvuRcusE J. INT'L L. & Com. 227-57 (1976).
19. Such agreements are becoming more common. The United States has recently en-
tered into similar agreements with China and Mexico.
20. This may not be technically correct. It is the understanding of the author that dur-
ing the negotiations on the supply level for the fourth agreement year, the United States
informed the Soviets that they could acquire up to 25 million tons of grain from the U.S.
market. The Soviets, however, did not formally commit themselves to purchasing this
amount. Nevertheless, it appears to have been well understood by both sides that the Soviet
Union would purchase this amount, and all involved parties (including the private grain
trade) operated on this assumption.
21. For a description of the Soviet foreign trade system, see Berman & Bustin, The
Soviet System of Foreign Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 987 (1975). See also Berman,
Soviet-American Trade in a Legal Perspective, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 217 (1975).
22. See Agricultural Trade Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. § 612(c)(3) (1976). There are a number
of ancillary provisions in the Grain Agreement, such as a cross-reference to the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Maritime Agreement, which are not relevant to the subject matter of this article.
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vate party. Nevertheless, it is an international agreement which creates
rights and obligations under international law between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Did, then, the embargo violate the Grain
Agreement?
The position of the United States is that the embargo did not violate
the Grain Agreement. Article II of the agreement contains the following
provision: "During the term of this Agreement, except as otherwise
agreed by the Parties, the Government of the USA shall not exercise any
discretionary authority available to it under United States law to control
exports of wheat and corn purchased for supply to the USSR in accor-
dance with Article 1.''13 It is the view of the United States that this provi-
sion applies only to the six to eight million ton level specified in Article I.
It does not apply to amounts in excess of eight million tons, which are
negotiated under Article VI. Therefore, the embargo did not violate the
Grain Agreement, since the United States did in fact supply eight million
tons of grain to the U.S.S.R. during the fourth year of the agreement.
III. USDA ACTIONS TO OFFSET THE IMPACT OF THE EMBARGO
In his message of January 4, 1980, President Carter directed the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to take all necessary measures to offset any adverse
impacts of the embargo on farmers. This directive eventually lead to the
implementation of a wide range of actions by the USDA. To understand
these actions fully requires a brief description of the grain marketing
system.
A. The Grain Marketing System
1. The Physical Flow of Grain
The flow of grain from the American farmer to the foreign purchaser
can easily be traced. Generally speaking, the farmer will harvest the grain
and truck it to a country elevator. The country elevator may be operated
by a local grain merchant, a farmers' cooperative, or a grain company.
23. Article I of the Grain Agreement, note 16 supra, reads as follows:
The Government of the USA and the Government of the USSR hereby
enter into an Agreement for the purchase and sale of wheat and corn for sup-
ply to the USSR. To this end, during the period that this Agreement is in
force, except as otherwise agreed by the Parties, (i) the foreign trade organiza-
tions of the USSR shall purchase from private commercial sources, for ship-
ment in each twelve month period beginning October 1, 1976, six million met-
ric tons of wheat and corn, in approximately equal proportions, grown in the
USA; and (ii) the Government of the USA shall employ its good offices to facil-
itate and encourage such sales by private commercial sources.
The foreign trade organizations of the USSR may increase this quantity
without consultations by up to two million metric tons in any twelve month
period, beginning October 1, 1976, unless the Government of the USA deter-
mines that the USA has a grain supply of less than 225 million metric tons as
defined in Article V.
Purchases/sales of wheat and corn under this Agreement will be made at
the market price prevailing for these products at the time of purchase/sale and
in accordance with normal commercial terms.
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From the country elevator the grain will be transported by rail to a sub-
terminal or terminal elevator. The latter two types of elevators may best
be described as regional concentration points in the grain marketing sys-
tem. Eventually the grain will be transferred by rail or barge (for exam-
ple, down the Mississippi River) to an export elevator located at a port.
The export elevator will then load the grain aboard an ocean vessel for
carriage to the foreign destination.
Two important factors should be noted at this point. First, grain is a
fungible commodity. From the time it leaves the farmer to the time it is
loaded aboard a ship, it is neither earmarked nor identified as being des-
tined for a particular purchaser or as having come from a particular
farmer or elevator. Second, as one moves down the marketing chain to-
ward the port of export, the system is more accurately characterized as a
pipeline, rather than as a storage system. Thus, an export elevator is
strictly a "put-through" facility through which grain from the interior is
transferred to ocean vessels. Grain cannot be stored economically at an
export location.
2. The Contractual Flow of Grain
The contractual flow of grain is considerably more complex. The
farmer may sell his grain to the country elevator, in which case he will
simply receive a check. On the other hand, the farmer may store his grain
at the elevator, in which case he will receive a warehouse receipt. The
warehouse receipt is a negotiable document which the farmer may sell at
some future date to a grain merchant, broker, or grain company. These
"interior" merchants will in turn sell grain to other intermediaries in the
grain marketing system. Eventually grain will reach a U.S. exporting firm,
which in turn has a sales contract with a foreign purchaser.
This is a highly simplistic description of an extremely complex mar-
keting system. The important point to remember is that with the excep-
tion of the farmer and the ultimate foreign purchaser, all of the interme-
diate actors are "hedging" operations. These actors (grain merchants,
brokers, grain companies, exporters, etc.) attempt at all times to maintain
an "even" position, that is, to have sales precisely match purchases. A
completely "hedged" operation is protected against fluctuations in the
market price of a commodity. They make their profits, like all middle-
men, by charging their purchasers a slight premium over the cost of the
commodity. Generally speaking, these actors make their profits on high
volume rather than on high mark-ups or market price fluctuations.
In practice, of course, a middleman is rarely in a precisely even posi-
tion. There is always a time lag between the time a purchase or sale is
made and the time that purchase or sale is "covered" by a corresponding
sale or purchase in the market. Also, a covering transaction may not pre-
cisely match the transaction it is meant to cover; there may be differences
in volume, grade, delivery period, or even type of commodity (the last
being known as a "cross-hedge"). To the extent that a middleman is not
"even," he is in a speculative "short" or "long" position. A short position
1981
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occurs when the middleman has more sales than covering purchases. A
long position occurs when the converse is true.
B. USDA Actions
1. The Short Term Problem
The sudden imposition of the U.S.S.R. grain embargo created both
short term and long term problems which required immediate attention.
The short term problem may be summed up as nothing less than prevent-
ing the imminent collapse of the U.S. grain marketing system. This prob-
lem was contractual, psychological, and logistical in nature. First, it rap-
idly became clear that cutting off contracts for approximately 13.8 million
tons and expected options of 3.2 million tons of grain would lead to cata-
strophic losses for the grain export firms." A number of the firms would
certainly have gone bankrupt, leaving them unable to honor their con-
tracts with interior suppliers. The collapse of these firms would have sent
a tidal wave of losses and bankruptcies back through the marketing
chain. To prevent this collapse, USDA stepped into the gap with the con-
tract assumption operation. This operation is described in detail in part
IV below.
Second, the problem was psychological in nature because everyone
suddenly became aware of the fact that the United States had lost seven-
teen million tons of export contracts for grain out of a total anticipated
export level of 112.9 million tons. The presence of such a large, unex-
pected surplus, in the absence of USDA action, would have led to a crash
in domestic grain prices, with a corresponding ruinous effect upon farm-
ers. To offset this effect, USDA publicly pledged to remove and isolate
from the market quantities of grain that were equivalent to the amounts
embargoed. Contrary to a misconception that is still held by many,9 ' the
decision to isolate grain from the market was not synonymous with the
decision to assume export contracts. The difference will be explained in
parts IV and V below.
Third, the problem was logistical in nature because, as discussed
above, the U.S. grain marketing system basically operates on a pipeline
concept. The imposition of the embargo temporarily clogged the pipeline
by suddenly eliminating the Soviet offtake. As a result, many participants
in the marketing chain suffered losses due to rail car, barge, and ship
demurrage, as well as elevator carrying charges.
The logistical problem might have been largely avoided because, even
under the terms of the embargo, there were still over two million tons of
grain left to be shipped to the U.S.S.R. This would have given the mar-
24. As was previously stated, the United States and the U.S.S.R. had agreed upon a
supply level of 25 million tons for the fourth year of the Grain Agreement. Of this amount,
only 21.8 million tons had been contracted for prior to January 7, 1980. However, it was
widely anticipated that Soviets would continue to make purchases up to the full 25 million
tons.
25. See, e.g., Paarlberg, supra note 2, at 147.
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keting system pipeline a breathing period in which to adjust to the loss of
Soviet exports. Two factors, however, intervened to prevent this from oc-
curring. First, it was necessary to establish an export licensing system in
order to permit shipments up to the eight million ton level. Although the
Department of Commerce did establish a system and issue export li-
censes, this of course took some time to accomplish. Second, and more
importantly, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) an-
nounced its own total embargo on shipments to the U.S.S.R." It was not
until late February that this problem was really solved through a number
of court injunctions against the ILA, and shipments were completed only
in April.
In fact, there was very little the USDA or anyone else (except the
ILA) could have done to alleviate the physical clogging of the pipeline.
The surplus in the pipeline was eventually worked off by the export mar-
keting system.
2. The Long Term Problem
The long term problem was to assure farmers that they would not
suffer a disproportionate amount of the losses caused by the embargo.
Despite all the actions mentioned above, there was no absolute guarantee
to the farmer that prices would not fall. Indeed, many forecasters had
predicted falling grain prices before the embargo. At the same time, for
reasons totally unrelated to the embargo, farmers were facing rapidly in-
creasing costs. A decline in farm income was inevitable before the em-
bargo, and the contribution of the embargo to this process, if any, is im-
possible to gauge accurately. A final complicating factor was the
presidential election campaign, and the prospect of the politicization of
the Soviet grain embargo.
At any rate, immediately after the embargo was imposed, USDA an-
nounced a number of steps which were designed to directly benefit farm-
ers. These included raising price support levels and modifying the farmer-
held grain reserve to make participation in the reserve more attractive.
The latter action did, at the same time, play a significant role in the
USDA effort to isolate grain from the market.27
IV. THE CONTRACT AsSUMPTION OPERATION
A. The Decision to Assume the Grain Contracts
The first question any observer must ask is why it was necessary for
the USDA to undertake the contract assumption operation. The second
essential question is how the grains and soybean complex differed from
other affected agricultural commodities, that is, why the USDA refused to
26. For an interesting discussion of the ILA's role in the grain embargo, see id. at 146,
160-61.
27. A variety of actions similar to these, as well as other types of actions, were taken
throughout the spring and summer of 1980. The degree to which these actions were related
to the embargo is not, in all instances, entirely clear. A detailed discussion of these actions is
beyond the scope of this article.
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assume contracts for frozen chickens, hog carcasses, meat extenders, etc.,
which were also cut off by the embargo. The answer to these questions
are both factual and legal in nature. Both aspects will be discussed in
turn.
1. The Factual Basis for the Decision
The factual basis for the decision was grounded in two overriding
factors: (1) the nature of the grain marketing system; and (2) the magni-
tude of the amount of sales affected. As has been pointed out above, grain
exporting companies.are hedging operations: they attempt to maintain a
relatively even position as between sales and purchases. This was the case
on January 4, 1980. On that date total outstanding export sales to all
destinations totalled 306 million bushels of wheat (of which fifty-seven
percent were Soviet sales), and 917 million bushels of corn (of which
forty-nine percent were Soviet sales).28 Thus, the imposition of the em-
bargo suddenly placed the grain exporting firms in a "long" (purchases
exceeding sales) position of about 623 million tons of wheat and corn. As
prudent businessmen, the exporters could not have maintained this type
of speculative position.
2 9
The fact that the exporters were suddenly long 623 million tons of
grain does not, however, fully explain the necessity for assuming their
contracts. It is also necessary to compare the prices at which those con-
tracts were originally hedged with the prices exporters could have ex-
pected to obtain upon selling the 623 million tons of grain.
Most of the Soviet purchases (and, consequently, the corresponding
hedging transactions) were made during the summer and fall of 1979. At
that time, prices of corn and wheat were significantly higher than in early
January 1980. Thus, even putting aside the extreme price depressant ef-
fect of 623 million tons of grain being dumped on the market, grain ex-
porting firms would have suffered catastrophic losses if they had been
forced to liquidate their long position after January 4.s1
It was the judgment of USDA officials that such a situation would
have had a cataclysmic effect on the U.S. grain marketing system. First,
of the fourteen grain exporting firms involved, many of the smaller firms
(and even some of the larger ones) could have been bankrupted. These
28. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Issue Briefing Paper No. 26: The CCC Assumption of
Grain Exporting Contracts 2-3 (July 18, 1980).
29. Also, the legal requirements of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and
the financial requirements of the exporters' banks would have forced the exporters to liqui-
date their long position.
30. By way of illustration, one should also look at what would happen in the converse
situation, i.e., where the hedging price was significantly lower than the market price at the
time an embargo was imposed. In that situation (again putting aside the price depressant
effect of the embargo) the exporter would be in a position to make huge windfall profits.
This would be the case because the exporter would then be holding relatively low-priced
purchase contracts while at the same time being able to resell the grain represented by those
contracts into a relatively high-priced world market. In the above scenario, a windfall profits
tax rather than a contract assumption operation would, arguably, be appropriate.
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firms would have been unable to honor their interior contracts, causing a
domino effect right back to the farmer. Second, virtually all of these firms
would have attempted to liquidate at least a portion of their long position
by refusing to honor their interior contracts, claiming force majeure as a
defense. This too would have swept back through the system like a tidal
wave.
To prevent this disaster from occurring, the Government announced
on January 7, 1980, that it would assume the contracts affected by the
embargo.81 In return, the exporters agreed to act responsibly by: (1) con-
tinuing to honor their interior contracts; (2) not liquidating their "long"
position by dumping corn and wheat on the market; and (3) working off
the surplus in the pipeline in order to alleviate congestion at the ports
and in the transportation system.
2. The Legal Basis for the Decision
The contract assumption operation has been described as an "un-
usual improvisation." '82 It was accomplished through an equally unique
governmental entity known as the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC).
In simplest terms, CCC is a wholly owned government corporation
designed to finance price support, commodity stabilization, and a wide
variety of other agriculturally related programs. It operates within the
USDA under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture.
The existence of the CCC permits the expenditure of money 6n farm-
related programs without the need for specific appropriations or authoriz-
ing legislation from Congress. As a technical matter, CCC "borrows"
money from the Treasury to carry on its activities. The CCC is then "re-
imbursed" for its net realized losses through the annual appropriation
process. Thus, CCC gives the Secretary of Agriculture a very flexible tool
for dealing with unanticipated events such as the embargo. It is extremely
unlikely that a successful contract assumption operation could have been
undertaken in the absence of a mechanism such as the CCC.
Of course, CCC may only make expenditures for those purposes au-
thorized by the CCC Charter Act.s Sections 2 and 5 of the Charter Act
set forth a number of general purposes. The contract assumption opera-
tion was implemented under the authority of the Charter Act to remove
surpluses, to stabilize markets, and to protect farm income.8 . It is impor-
tant to note that the Charter Act contains no authority to indemnify ex-
porters for losses due to adverse government actions.
In this respect, the legal basis for the contract assumption operation
31. It is not clear whether officials in the White House and USDA were fully cognizant
of the necessity for the contract assumption operation prior to the imposition of the em-
bargo on January 4. It is clear, however, that the decision to assume the contracts was not
made until January 6, 1980, after all the exporters had pleaded their case before high level
USDA officials.
32. Paarlberg, supra note 2, at 147.
33. Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1976).
34. Id. §§ 714, 714(b), 714(c).
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highlights the critical difference between grains and the other agricultural
commodities affected by the embargo. First, the magnitude of the sales of
other agricultural commodities in relation to the overall market in those
- commodities was very small, as compared to the grains situation. It would
have been very difficult, if not impossible, to make the factual determina-
tions required by the Charter Act.
Second, the other affected commodities are not traded in the same
fashion as grains, soybeans, and soybean products. As has been shown
above, it was necessary to assume the grain, soybean, and soybean prod-
uct contracts because of the potential collapse of the market. This was
not the case with the other commodities. Most of those commodities were
sold directly from the producer to the Soviet Union. There was no "hedg-
ing" of any sort involved. Therefore, even if one could make the factual
determinations concerning surpluses, market stabilization, and the pro-
tection of farm income, there would be no justification for purchasing the
commodities in question only from the adversely affected exporter at the
Soviet contract price and specifications, as opposed to purchases in the
open market at market prices. In reality, this would simply have been an
indemnification operation rather than a surplus removal operation, and as
mentioned above, there is no authority for such an operation in the CCC
Charter Act.
B. The CCC-Exporter Agreement
1. Negotiation of the Agreement
The CCC-Exporter Agreement was the product of four weeks of in-
tensive negotiation between the exporters and the USDA. 5 The contents
of the agreement were finalized in early February 1980, and the agree-
ment was signed by twelve of the fourteen companies affected."
After the decision to assume the contracts had been made, the Secre-
tary of Agriculture appointed the General Counsel of USDA to conduct
negotiations with the exporters in order to develop an agreement under
which USDA would assume the contracts. A task force was formed within
the Department to formulate the USDA position, to draft a proposed
agreement, and to negotiate that proposal with the exporters.
An initial draft of the agreement was presented to the exporters dur-
ing the week of January 15, 1980. After two general meetings between the
exporters and USDA during the following week, it was generally agreed
that the essential terms of a workable agreement had been developed. An
informal committee of five persons,8 7 was then appointed by the exporters
35. In reality, there are two agreements. The CCC-Exporter Agreement covers wheat,
corn, and soybeans. The CCC Soybean Meal and Oil Agreement covers soybean products.
The latter agreement was negotiated after the first, and contains substantially similar gen-
eral terms. The second agreement was necessitated by the fact that soybean meal and oil are
not traded on the same basic contract terms as wheat, corn, and soybeans.
36. The formal offer of the CCC to the affected exporters expired on February 15, 1980.
Three firms signed the CCC Soybean Meal and Oil Agreement later that spring.
37. The five members of this informal committee were drawn from the four major ex-
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to work out the final, more minor details of the agreement with USDA.
Thus, by the end of January the agreement had essentially reached its
final form.
2. Term of the Agreement
It is beyond the scope of this article to describe in detail every provi-
sion of the CCC-Exporter Agreement. Nevertheless, it should prove use-
ful to describe the general thrust of the agreement, certain of its key pro-
visions, and how it was meant to operate.
a. Structure of the Agreement
The general objective of the agreement was to provide a framework
by which CCC could acquire from the exporters the contract rights to
receive delivery of grain which otherwise would have been shipped to the
Soviet Union, and eventually retender those same contract rights back
into the export market. It is important to note at this point that the sub-
ject matter of the agreement is contract rights to receive delivery of grain
at a certain port range during a certain period of time (for example,
"50,000 tons No. 3 yellow corn, Gulf ports, May delivery"). Such rights
are commonly traded between both exporters and overseas purchasers.
Thus, the subject matter of the agreement did not refer to actual, physi-
cal stocks of grain.88
The typical contract for the exportation of grain from the United
States is the North American Export Grain Association No. 2 F.O.B. Con-
tract (NAEGA 2). In assuming these contract rights, CCC in effect ac-
quired a massive inventory of basically similar contract rights to receive
delivery of grain at a variety of port ranges8' for a variety of delivery
periods.
Despite the fact that these contract rights were basically similar,
some important differences did exist between the various exporters and
even between individual contracts made by the same exporter. The CCC-
Exporter Agreement standardized these contracts by converting them to
a single, uniform basis.40 Price adjustments were made to reflect changes
in the original terms of the contract.
The second important objective of the agreement was to establish a
number of special provisions outside the NAEGA 2 framework that would
porters (Cargill, Bunge, Louis-Dreyfus, and Continental) and one smaller company (Tidewa-
ter Grain).
38. This distinction is legally important because of various statutory restrictions on the
sale of stacks of grain held by CCC. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1445(e), 1427 (Supp. I 1979). These
restrictions prohibit the sale of commodities held by CCC at prices which are below a cer-
tain minimum. The contract assumption operation could not have been successfully imple-
mented if these restrictions also applied to contract rights, since the retendering of the con-
tract rights was an integral part of the operation.
39. The four basic port ranges are Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes, and Pacific.
40. This was accomplished by incorporating in each individual exporter's agreement a
schedule containing the essential terms of the exporter's contracts with the purchaser for
shipment to the U.S.S.R.
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govern the mutual obligations between the exporters and the CCC. These
provisions included certain certifications by the exporter, a profit deduc-
tion, a short position deduction, and a rollover provision. These provi-
sions will be discussed below.
b. Specific Provisions of the Agreement
i. Force Majeure Certification
Several specific provisions of the CCC-Exporter Agreement deserve
special attention. The first of these is the certification by the exporter
that it will honor its interior contracts, notwithstanding the imposition of
the embargo or the boycott actions of the ILA."' In effect, the exporter
waived any right to assert a force majeure defense against interior suppli-
ers. This waiver, from the point of view of USDA, was the primary quid
pro quo of the agreement.
ii. Profit Deduction
Another important provision of the agreement is the profit deduc-
tion. Under the terms of the agreement, the contract price between CCC
and the exporter is the Soviet contract price (plus or minus an adjust-
ment for standardization of terms) less an undetermined deduction for
profit and short position.42 When settling a contract under the agreement,
therefore, CCC initially makes payment of only ninety-seven percent of
the Soviet contract price to the exporter.4 3 The final three percent is
withheld pending the determination of an appropriate deduction from the
Soviet contract price for profit and short position.
The profit deduction was included at the insistence of USDA. The
real problem, however, was how to formulate a workable method of deter-
mining an appropriate deduction. First, it was clear that there was no way
of calculating a profit on the Soviet sales alone. It is impossible to extract
these sales and corresponding hedges from the overall sales and hedging
operations of all but the smallest exporters.
41. This provision (Section II(C), reads as follows:
C. The Exporter certifies that it and its affiliates have not breached or
failed to perform, and will not at any time in the future breach or fail to per-
form, any obligation to third parties (exclusive of the original purchasers, in
their capacities as purchasers, under the eligible contracts) in the U.S. agricul-
tural and transportation industries (including but not limited to farmers, ware-
housemen, elevator operators, and transport operators) on the grounds that
such obligation has been modified, terminated, rescinded, excused, or nullified
by: (1) the imposition of restrictions on the exportation of agricultural com-
modities by the President on January 4, 1980, and as implemented by the reg-
ulations issued on January 7, 1980, at 45 FR 1883, and as may later be
amended; or (2) the refusal of the International Longshoremen's Association to
handle cargo destined for the USSR. Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude
the Exporter and its affiliates from entering into modifications, by mutual con-
sent, of the terms and conditions of existing contracts with third parties in the
U.S. agricultural and transportation industries.
42. Id. § III(B)(1).
43. Id. § II(B)(3). Under NAEGA 2, payment does not occur until delivery of the com-
modity is made. Thus, provisional payments continued to be made through February 1981.
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Second, it rapidly became clear that there was no way to define
"profit" in a single document that would be applicable to all exporters.
Moreover, the urgency of concluding an agreement would not have per-
mitted the negotiation of a separate provision for each exporter.
To solve this dilemma, the exporters and USDA agreed to establish
an independent board of accountants. One member of the board was ap-
pointed by the exporters, one by USDA, and one by the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants. The board was charged with devel-
oping standards and procedures for determining the profit margin for
each exporter. Applying these standards, both the exporter and USDA
auditors were to determine a profit margin for the exporter. If there was
any disagreement between the two figures, USDA and the exporter would
attempt to negotiate a mutually acceptable figure. If they were unable to
do so, the dispute would be presented to the board for resolution.
iii. Short Position Deduction"
Theoretically, to the extent that an exporter was "short" on January
4, 1980, the imposition of the embargo did not have an adverse effect on
that particular exporter. In other words, the "short" position could ab-
sorb some of the "long" position that was created by the imposition of the
embargo. Therefore, if CCC assumed all of the affected contracts, export-
ers who were short on January 4, 1980, would remain short. They could
then move into a falling market (falling as a result of the embargo) and
garner undeserved windfall profits because of the decline in the market.
From a practical point of view, however, the fact that a particular
exporter was short on January 4, 1980, would have had very little to do
with whether a high-priced Soviet contract had been covered by a compa-
rably high-priced hedge several months earlier. An exporter might have
been "long" or "even" during all of 1979 and still have been short on
January 4, 1980, for reasons totally unrelated to its Soviet sales (for ex-
ample, a sale made that day to Japan or the EEC). This problem was
resolved by providing for a short position deduction based on the smallest
amount by which the exporter was short between the date of the ex-
porter's last Soviet sale and January 4, 1980. The amount of any such
short position would be pro-rated to the exporter's Soviet business and
then converted to a monetary deduction from the Soviet contract price.
iv. Rollover Provision"
The rollover differential is the cost of changing a delivery period on a
44. Id. § III(B)(2).
45. This provision of the Agreement (Section III(B)(5), reads as follows:
(5) CCC may, at its option, change the delivery period in any given con-
tract or a portion thereof to a later period of its choice, but no later than
March 31, 1981. If CCC exercises this option, the contract price shall be in-
creased or decreased by the amount of the market differentials for the later
delivery period as of the date of the exercise of the option. However, for deliv-
ery periods beginning prior to March 1, 1980, the relevant market differentials
(cents per bushel) shall be:
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contract. Generally speaking, the longer a delivery is deferred, the greater
the differential. The rollover differential is treated as an adjustment in
the contract price.
It was clear from the outset of the negotiations on the CCC-Exporter
Agreement that it would be impossible for USDA to begin immediately to
liquidate the contract rights it was about to acquire. It was therefore nec-
essary to "roll over" contract delivery dates from earlier months to later
months. The agreement provided for rollovers through June 1980 at spec-
ified differentials. Rollovers into later months were based on market price
differentials in existence at the time the rollover option was exercised by
USDA. 46
C. Retendering of Contract Rights
With the exception of calculating the appropriate profit and short
position deductions, the contract assumption operation was basically
completed with the successful retendering of the contract rights back into
the export market. Beginning in late March, USDA held tenders twice
weekly for each commodity in which it accepted bids on its inventory of
contract rights. Bids were accepted or rejected based on an evaluation of
current market prices and conditions. The retendering process was com-
pleted in midsummer 1980. Delivery of grain on the retendered contracts
continued through February 1981. Consequently, payments to exporters
(as well as payments to USDA from the purchasers of the contract rights)
continued through that date.
Original Period Later Period
March, 1980 April, 1980 May, 1980 June, 1980
Corn Corn Corn Corn
December, 1979 20 27 30 38
January, 1980 20 27 30 38
February, 1980 10 17 20 27V2
Wheat Wheat Wheat Wheat
December, 1979 6V 16 18 21 /
January, 1980 6 16 18 21
February, 1980 2 113 14 15
Soybeans Soybeans Soybeans Soybeans
December, 1979 18 30 39 56
January, 1980 18 30 39 56
February, 1980 8 21 27 434
CCC shall give notice to the Exporter that it is exercising its option under this
provision not less than 30 days before the beginning of the original delivery
period, or not more than 30 days after the signing of this Agreement, which-
ever is later.
The differentials given in the schedule above were based on the differentials as they existed
on January 4, 1980.
46. The total rollover cost was approximately $170 million.
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V. REMOVAL OF SURPLUS COMMODITIES
The contract assumption operation was not in and of itself a surplus
removal operation. Indeed, attempting to take delivery on export con-
tracts would have added another layer of complexity to an already diffi-
cult situation. Delivery could not be accomplished at export locations
since these elevators are not storage facilities. Conversion of the contracts
to interior delivery, where storage was available, would have required in-
credibly complex and time-consuming negotiations.
The surplus removal aspect of the operation was accomplished by di-
rect USDA purchases of wheat and corn and by entry of corn into the
farmer-held reserve.47 By the end of April 1980, USDA had purchased 4.1
million tons of wheat.48 Also, by midsummer, USDA had purchased 4.1
million tons of corn and farmers had placed 7.2 million tons into the
farmer-held reserve. These figures are clearly in excess of the amounts of
wheat and corn that were affected by the embargo. The figures are even
more impressive when it is considered that total U.S. exports of wheat
and corn actually declined very slightly from the levels that were forecast
prior to the embargo, and were much higher (by volume) than during the
previous year.
VI. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The grain embargo of 1980 vividly demonstrated how the use of ex-
port controls can be a two-edged sword. In attempting to influence Soviet
behavior, the President placed the entire U.S. grain marketing system
into an extremely precarious position overnight. A collapse of the system
was only averted through the swift and prudent actions of administration
officials and the grain exporting firms. One can only speculate as to what
might have happened had some exporters panicked, or had the Govern-
ment reacted less quickly to the needs of the moment.
From a strictly operational point of view, the contract assumption
operation can probably be described as extremely successful, despite the
fact that CCC lost over $450 million in the process.49 The CCC-Exporter
Agreement did achieve its immediate goal of preventing the collapse of
the market. It was negotiated over a very short period of time, and was
implemented without any major difficulties. Almost overnight, USDA ac-
quired contract rights to receive 8.9 million tons of corn, 4.3 million tons
47. The farmer-held reserve is a mechanism by which farmers agree to hold a commod-
ity off the market until prices reach certain predetermined levels. In return, the farmer
receives a non-recourse price support loan, which is practically interest free, as well as stor-
age payments. See 7 U.S.C. § 1445(e) (Supp. I 1979).
48. Under the authority of a statute recently passed by Congress, the wheat will be
placed into an international emergency reserve for use in food aid programs during times of
short supply or to meet urgent humanitarian needs of an unanticipated nature. Food Secur-
ity Wheat Reserve.Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-494, 94 Stat. 2578 (1980).
49. The total value (Soviet price) of the contract rights acquired by the USDA was $2.4
billion. Counting rollover costs, it is anticipated that total CCC losses will be around $460
million.
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of wheat, 710,318 tons of soybeans, 400,000 tons of soybean meal, and
30,000 tons of soybean oil, and within seven months had retendered these
contracts back into the export market without adversely affecting the
market.
Nevertheless, when the danger to the United States grain marketing
system and the eventual costs to the Government are considered, it must
seriously be questioned whether food exports really do constitute, because
of domestic considerations, a potentially effective and credible foreign
policy tool. Indeed, one might argue that food exports, rather than a for-
eign policy tool, are a foreign policy liability because of the dependence
of the agricultural sector of the domestic economy on such exports. In
this respect, the essential lesson of the grain embargo may be that as the
United States becomes more economically interdependent with the rest of
the world, its ability to take unilateral actions such as grain embargoes is
correspondingly diminished. To a certain extent, the United States is in
need of Soviet purchases just as much as the Soviets are in need of U.S.
grain. Thus, the concept of food as a weapon may be largely illusory.
Moreover, even if the economic ramifications of an embargo can be
managed, it is not at all clear that the political and psychological impacts
of an embargo on agricultural commodities can likewise be contained.
Rightly or wrongly, many farmers view such embargoes as an unfair and
ineffective method of attempting to influence the behavior of foreign
countries.
It is not surprising, therefore, that this issue has extremely complex
political overtones. The embargo was clearly a significant issue in a num-
ber of states during the 1980 presidential campaign. Predictably, a num-
ber of bills were introduced in the present session of Congress either to
end the embargo (which is now a moot point) or to restrict the freedom of
the President to impose embargoes on agricultural commodities in the
future." In addition, it can be argued that the debate over the embargo
detracted from the consideration of other major farm policy questions.51
At the same time, President Reagan, who during the 1980 campaign
expressed a desire to lift the embargo, was unable to do so immediately
because of the crisis in Poland.5" This also demonstrated an important
aspect of the use of embargoes in general. They are an easily identifiable
and highly visible type of foreign policy action. The lifting of an embargo,
as well as its imposition, may therefore have very significant foreign pol-
50. In the 97th Congress, 1st Session, see, e.g., S. Res. 63, S. 355, H.R. 2233, and H.R.
2243 (1981).
51. Several important provisions of major farm statutes expire at the end of the 1981
crop year. Consequently, Congress is now actively considering various proposals for inclu-
sion in the 1981 omnibus farm bill.
52. President Reagan initially refused to lift the embargo because he felt that it would
be sending the "wrong signal" to the Soviet Union during the Polish crisis. See Wash. Post,
Apr. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 5. The President did, however, lift the embargo on April 24, 1981.
See Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 1981, at 1, col. 5.
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icy and domestic political ramifications. In this respect, embargoes can be
a relatively inflexible foreign policy tool.
This is not to say that the imposition of export controls on agricul-
tural commodities can never be utilized as a foreign policy tool or as a
means of strengthening national security by deterring aggression by other
countries. The grain embargo of 1980 does demonstrate, however, that
such actions have extremely important domestic ramifications which
must be weighed more carefully in the future against the objectives and
probability of success.

